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Abstract
A popular methodology for building binary decision-making classifiers in the presence of
imperfect information is to first construct a calibrated non-binary “scoring” classifier, and then
to post-process this score to obtain a binary decision. We study various group fairness properties
of this methodology, when the non-binary scores are calibrated over all protected groups, and
with a variety of post-processing algorithms. Specifically, we show:
• There does not exist a general way to post-process a calibrated classifier to equalize pro-
tected groups’ positive or negative predictive value (PPV or NPV). For certain “nice”
calibrated classifiers, either PPV or NPV can be equalized when the post-processor uses
different thresholds across protected groups. Still, when the post-processing consists of
a single global threshold across all groups, natural fairness properties, such as equalizing
PPV in a nontrivial way, do not hold even for “nice” classifiers.
• When the post-processing stage is allowed to defer on some decisions (that is, to avoid
making a decision by handing off some examples to a separate process), then for the non-
deferred decisions, the resulting classifier can be made to equalize PPV, NPV, false positive
rate (FPR) and false negative rate (FNR) across the protected groups. This suggests a
way to partially evade the impossibility results of Chouldechova and Kleinberg et al.,
which preclude equalizing all of these measures simultaneously. We also present different
deferring strategies and show how they affect the fairness properties of the overall system.
We then evaluate our post-processing techniques using the COMPAS data set from 2016.
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1 Introduction
The concept of fairness is deeply ingrained in our psyche as a fundamental, essential ingredient of
Human existence. Indeed the perception of fairness, broadly construed as accepting each others’
equal right for well being, is arguably one of the most basic tenets of cooperative societies of
individuals in general, and Human existence in particular.
However, as fundamental as this concept may be, it is also extremely elusive: different societies
have developed very different notions of fairness and equality among individuals, subject to different
religious, ethical, and social beliefs; in particular, the intricate interplay between fairness and justice,
which is yet another somewhat elusive concept, is often not well-defined and a matter of subjective
interpretation.
The concept is further complicated by the fact that human decisions are often made with
incomplete information and limited resources. These two factors must be taken into account when
evaluating whether decision-making processes are “fair.” Indeed, these two aspects of the problem
have become increasingly prominent as societies grow and decision processes become more complex
and algorithmic.
One way that researchers are responding to these growing concerns is by attempting to formu-
late precise notions for fairness of decisions processes, e.g. [DHP+11, KMR16]. While these notions
do not intend to capture the complexities of the ethical, socio-economic, or religious aspects of fair-
ness, they do consider the fairness aspects of statistical decision-making processes with incomplete
information. Essentially, these notions accept the fact that a decision process with incomplete infor-
mation will inevitably make errors relative to the desired full-information notion (which is treated
as a given), and provide guidelines on how to “distribute the errors fairly” across individuals, or
alternatively across groups of individuals. These definitions have proven to be meaningful and eye
opening; in particular, it has been demonstrated that some very natural notions of “fair distribu-
tion of errors” are mutually inconsistent: No decision mechanism with incomplete information can
satisfy all, except for in trivial cases [Cho17, KMR16].
Faced with this basic impossibility, we would like to better understand the process of decision
making with incomplete information, and use this understanding to propose ways to circumvent
this impossibility.
Specifically, we concentrate on the task of post-processing a calibrated soft classifier under group
fairness constraints. We suppose that individuals belong to one of two or more disjoint protected
groups. Our overall task is to decide whether a given individual has some hidden binary property
B in a way that ensures “fair balancing of errors” across the groups.
For that purpose, we consider the following two-stage mechanism. The first stage consists of
constructing a classifier Sˆ that outputs for each individual x a score s ∈ [0, 1] that is related to the
chance that x has property B. The only requirement we make of Sˆ is group-wise calibration: for
both g1 and g2, and for each s ∈ [0, 1], the fraction of individuals in the group that get score s and
have the property, out of all individuals in the group that get score s, is s. The second stage takes
as input the output s = Sˆ(x) of the first stage and the group to which x belongs, and outputs a
binary decision: its best guess at whether x has property B.
An attractive aspect of this two-stage mechanism is that each stage can be viewed as aimed at
a different goal: The first stage is aimed at gathering information and providing the best accuracy
possible, with only minimal regard to fairness (i.e only group-wise calibration). The second stage
is aimed to extract a decision from the information collected in the first stage, while making sure
that the errors are distributed “fairly.”
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To further focus our study, we take the first stage as a given and concentrate on the second.
That is, we consider the problem of post-processing the scores given by the calibrated soft classifier
Sˆ into binary predictions. A representative example is a judge making a bail decision based on
a score provided by a software package. Following [Cho17, HPS16] we consider the following four
performance measures for the resulting binary classifier: the positive predictive value (PPV), namely
the fraction of individuals that have the property among all individuals that the classifier predicted
to have the property; The false positive rate (FPR), namely the fraction of individuals that were
predicted to have the property among all individuals that don’t have the property; The negative
predictive value (NPV) and false negative rate (FNR), which are defined analogously. Ideally, we
would like to equalize each one of the four measures across the groups, i.e. the measure will have
the same value when restricted to samples from each group. Unfortunately, however, we know that
this is impossible in general [Cho17, KMR16]. This leads us to a broad question that motivates
our work:
Under what conditions can we post-process a calibrated soft classifier’s outputs so that
the resulting hard classifier equates a subset of {PPV,NPV,FNR,FPR} across a set of
protected groups? How can we balance these conflicting goals?
Results: Post-Processing With Thesholds. In a first set of results we consider the properties
obtained by post-processing via a “threshold” mechanism. Naively, a threshold post-processing
mechanism would return 1 for individual x whenever the calibrated score s(x) is above some fixed
threshold, and return 0 otherwise. We somewhat extend this mechanism by allowing the post-
processor “fine-tune” its decision by choosing the output probabilistically whenever the result of
the soft classifier is exactly the threshold.
We first observe that the popular and natural post-processing method of using a single threshold
across all groups has an inherent deficiency: No such mechanism can in general guarantee equality
of either PPV or NPV across the protected groups.
We then show that, when using different thresholds for the different groups, one can equalize
either PPV or NPV (but not both) across the two groups, assuming the profile of Sˆ has some
non-degeneracy property.
The combination of the impossibility of single threshold and the possibility of per-group thresh-
old also stands in contrast to the belief that a soft classifier that is calibrated across both groups
allows “ignoring” group-membership information in any post-processing decision [MP17]. Indeed,
the conversion to a binary decision “loses information” in different ways for the two groups, and so
group membership becomes relevant again after post-processing.
Results: Adding deferrals. For the second set of results we consider post-processing strategies
that do not always output a decision. Rather, with some probability the output is ⊥, or “I
dont know”, which means that the decision is deferred to another (hopefully higher quality, even
if more expensive) process. Let us first present our technical results and then discuss potential
interpretations and context.
The first strategy is a natural extension of the per-group threshold: we use two thresholds
per group, returning 1 above the right threshold, 0 below the left threshold, and ⊥ between the
thresholds. We show that there always exists a way to choose the thresholds such that, conditioned
on the decision not being ⊥, both the PPV and NPV are equal across groups.
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Next we show a family of post-processing strategies where, conditioned on the decision not
being ⊥, all four quantities (PPV, NPV, FPR, FNR) are equal across groups.
All strategies in this family have the following structure: Given an individual x, the strategy
first makes a randomized decision whether to defer on x, where the probability depends on Sˆ(x) and
the group membership of x. If not deferred, then the decision is made via another post-processing
technique.
One method for determining the probabilities of deferrals is to make sure that, the distribution
of scores returned by the calibrated soft classifier conditioned on not deferring, is equal for the
two groups (That is, let ps,g denote the probability, restricted to group g, that an element gets
score s conditioned on not deferring. Then for any s, we choose deferral probabilities so that
ps,g1 = ps,g2 .) The resulting classifier can then be post-processed in any group-blind way (say, via
a single threshold mechanism as described above).
Of course, the fact that all four quantities are equalized conditioned on not deferring does not,
in and of itself, provide any guarantees regarding the fairness properties of the overall decision
process — which includes also the downstream decision mechanism. For one, it would be naive to
simply assume that fairness “composes” [DI18]. Furthermore, the impossibility of [Cho17, KMR16]
says that the overall decision-making process cannot possibly equalize all four measures.
However, in some cases one can provide alternative (non-statistical) justification for the fairness
of the overall process: For instance, if the downstream decision process never errs, the overall process
might be considered “procedurally fair.” We present more detailed reflections on our deferral-based
approach in Section 6.
We note that deferring was considered in machine learning in a number of contexts, including the
context of fairness-preservation [MPZ17]. In these works, the classifier typically punts only when
its confidence regarding some decision is low. By contrast, we use deferrals in order to “equalize”
the probability mass functions of the soft classifier over the two groups, which may involve deferring
on individuals for whom there is higher confidence. Indeed, deferring on some higher-confidence
individuals seems inherent to our goal of equalizing PPV, NPV, FPR, and FNR while keeping
the deferral rate low. Furthermore, our framework allows for a wide range of deferral strategies
which might be used to promote additional goals. Pursuing alternate strategies for deferral is an
interesting direction for future work.
Experimental results. We test our methodology on the Broward county dataset with COM-
PAS scores made public by ProPublica [ALMK16] in order to better understand its strengths and
limitations. Indeed, it has been shown that the COMPAS scoring mechanism is an approximately
calibrated soft classifier. We first ran our two-threshold post-processing mechanism and obtained
a binary decision algorithm which equalizes both PPV and NPV across Caucasians and African-
Americans.
We then ran our post-processing mechanism with deferrals to equalize all four of PPV, NPV,
FPR, FNR across the two groups, with three different methods for deciding how to defer: In the first
method, decisions are deferred only for Caucasians; in the second, decisions are deferred only for
African Americans; in the third method, decisions are deferred for an equal fraction of Caucasians
and of African Americans. This fraction is precisely equal to the statistical (total variation) distance
between the distributions of scores produced by the soft classifier on the two groups. More details
about the results along with figures are given in Section 5.
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Extensions and open problems. As just mentioned, a natural question is to find alterna-
tive ways for deciding when to defer, along with ways to argue fairness properties for the overall
combined process.
We also leave open the setting where individuals belong to multiple, potentially intersecting
groups as in [HKRR17, KNRW18].
Yet another question is to consider additional (or alternative) properties of soft classifiers that
will make for more efficient or effective post-processing.
1.1 Related work
We briefly describe the works most closely related to ours, though both the list of works and
their summaries are inevitably too short. Our work fits in a research program on group fairness
notions following the work of Chouldechova [Cho17] and Kleinberg et al. [KMR16]. Those works
demonstrate the inherent infeasibility of simultaneously equalizing a collection of measures of group
accuracy. Our work considers the notions of calibration as formalized in [PRW+17] and those of
PPV, NPV, FPR, and FNR from [Cho17] and [KMR16].
The power of post-processing calibrated scores into decisions using threshold classifiers in the
context of fairness has been previously studied by Corbett-Davies, Pierson, Feller, Goel, and Huq
[CPF+17]. As in our work, they show that it is feasible to equalize certain statistical fairness
notions across groups using (possibly different) thresholds. They additionally show that these
thresholds are in some sense optimal. Whereas [CPF+17] focuses on statistical parity, conditional
statistical parity, and false positive rate, our most comparable results consider PPV. In our work,
we further show that in some cases thresholds fail to equalize both PPV and NPV (called predictive
parity by [Cho17]), unless we also allow our post-processor to defer on some inputs. Our work also
studies methods of post-processing that are much more powerful than thresholding, especially when
allowing deferrals. On the technical side, [CPF+17] assumes that their soft classifiers are supported
on the continuous interval [0, 1], simplifying the analyses. We instead study classifiers with finite
support as it is closer to true practice in many settings (e.g., COMPAS risk scores).
Using deferrals to promote fairness has been considered also in the work of Madras, Pitassi,
and Zemel [MPZ17]. Specifically they consider how deferring on some inputs may promote a
combination of accuracy and fairness, especially when taking explicit account of the downstream
decision maker. They make use of two-threshold deferring post-processors like those discussed
in Section 5. While it helped inform our work, [MPZ17] takes a more experimental approach
and focuses on minimizing the “disparate impact,” a measure of total difference in classification
error between groups, while maximizing accuracy. One important difference between our works is
that Madras et al. distinguish between “rejecting” and “deferring.” Rejecting is oblivious as to
properties of the downstream decision maker, while deferring tries to counteract the biases of the
decision maker. Our work considers only the former notion, but uses the term “defer” instead of
“reject.”
2 Preliminaries
We study the problem of binary classification. An instance is an element, usually denoted x, of a
universe X . We restrict our attention to instances sampled uniformly at random from the universe,
denoted X ∼ X . Our theory extends directly to any other distribution on X ; that distribution does
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not need to be known to the classifiers. Each instance x is associated with a true type Y (x) ∈ {0, 1}.
Each instance x is also associated with a group G(x) ∈ G, where G is the set of groups. We restrict
our attention to sets G that form a partition of the universe X . We denote by Xg the set of instances
x in group g, and by Xg the random variable distributed uniformly over Xg. Note that for any
events E1 and E2, PrX∼Xg [E1 | E2] = PrX∼X [E1 | E2, G(X) = g].
Definition 2.1 (Base rate (BR)). The base rate of a group g ∈ G, is
BRg = Pr[Y (Xg) = 1] = E[Y (Xg)]. (1)
When X is finite, BRg is simply the fraction of individuals x in the group g for whom Y (x) = 1.
A classifier is a randomized function with domain X ×G.1A hard classifier, denoted Yˆ , outputs
a prediction in {0, 1}, interpreted as a guess of the true type Y (x). A soft classifier, denoted Sˆ,
outputs a score s ∈ [0, 1], interpreted as a measure of confidence that Y (x) = 1. We restrict
our attention to soft classifiers with finite image. We call a classifier group blind if its output is
independent of the input group g. For all groups g ∈ G, we call a hard classifier Yˆ non-trivial on
g if Pr[Yˆ (Xg) = 1] > 0 and Pr[Yˆ (Xg) = 0] > 0. Hard classifiers are trivial on g if they are not
non-trivial on g.
A post-processor is a randomized function with domain [0, 1] × G. As with classifiers, a post-
processor can be hard or soft. A hard post-processor, denoted Dˆ, outputs a prediction in {0, 1}.
A soft post-processor, denoted Dˆsoft, outputs a score s ∈ [0, 1]. Observe that for a soft classifier
Sˆ, Dˆ ◦ Sˆ is a hard classifier, and Dˆsoft ◦ Sˆ is a soft classifier. As with classifiers, we call a post-
processor group blind if its output is independent of the group g, and we restrict our attention to
post-processors with finite image. The restriction to finite image is for mathematical convenience
(and also because digital memory leads to discrete universes); our results generalize to infinite
images as well.
In Section 4, we expand the definitions of both classifier and post-processors to allow an addi-
tional input or output: the special symbol ⊥.
2.1 Calibration
Several works concerning algorithmic fairness focus on various notions of calibration. The following
calibration notions are defined only over soft classifiers:
Definition 2.2 (Calibration (Soft)). We say a soft classifier Sˆ is calibrated if ∀s ∈ [0, 1] for which
PrX∼X [Sˆ(X) = s] > 0,
Pr
X∼X
[Y (X) = 1 | Sˆ(X) = s] = E
X∼X
[Y (X) | Sˆ(X) = s] = s.
The probability above is taken over the sampling of X, as well as random choices made by Sˆ at
classification time.
1As the focus of this paper is on the post processing of classifiers, we set aside questions such as the origin of the
given classifier, including the randomness used in training, the origin or quality of the training data, and societal
factors affecting the classifier. In particular, the classifiers we consider in this work are memoryless: they do not
remember inputs or random choices from previous invocations. That is, we assume that if X,X ′ are two indepen-
dent random variables drawn from X then Sˆ(X) and Sˆ(X ′) (respectively Yˆ (X) and Yˆ (X ′)) are also independent
random variables. (Our formalism can be naturally extended also to classifiers with initial randomized preprocessing,
by considering the family of derivative classifiers, where for each derivative classifier the random choices made at
preprocessing are fixed to some value. The formalism can then be applied separately to each derivative classifier.)
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x ∈ X s ∈ [0, 1] yˆ ∈ {0, 1}“soft”
Sˆ
“hard post-processor”
Dˆ
Dˆsoft
“soft post-processor”
“hard”
Yˆ
Figure 1: We call a classifier that returns results in [0, 1] a soft classifier to differentiate it from those which return
results in {0, 1}, which we call hard classifiers. We refer to classifiers that take as input the output of a soft classifier
as post-processors.
Definition 2.3 (Groupwise Calibration (Soft)). We say that a soft classifier Sˆ is groupwise cali-
brated if it is calibrated within all groups. That is, ∀g ∈ G and ∀s ∈ [0, 1] for which Pr[Sˆ(Xg) =
s] > 0, we have that
Pr[Y (Xg) = 1 | Sˆ(Xg) = s] = s.
Groupwise calibration is essentially the same notion as multicalibration [HKRR17] with the
difference that in their case the true types are values in [0, 1]. We use a different term to emphasize
that we restrict our attention to collections of groups G that form a partition of the universe X .
The two definitions above are stated for soft classifiers whose output distribution is discrete,
since we must be able to condition on the event Sˆ(X) = s or Sˆ(Xg) = s. That said, it extends natu-
rally to classifiers with continuously-distributed outputs provided that the conditional probabilities
are well defined.
2.2 Accuracy Profiles (APs)
Throughout this work, we make repeated reference to the probability mass function of the random
variable Sˆ(Xg) for a calibrated soft classifier Sˆ acting on a randomly distributed input Xg. We call
this distribution on calibrated scores an accuracy profile (AP).
Definition 2.4 (Accuracy Profile (AP)). The accuracy profile (AP) of a calibrated soft classifier Sˆ
for a group g, denoted by Pˆg, is the PMF of Sˆ(Xg). That is, for s ∈ [0, 1], Pˆg(s) = Pr[Sˆ(Xg) = s].
Abusing notation, we denote by Pˆ the collection {Pˆg}g∈G , and call it the AP of Sˆ. We denote
by Supp(Pˆg) the support of the AP Pˆg, namely the set Supp(Pˆ) = {s : ∃x ∈ Xg,∃r s.t. Sˆ(x, r) =
s} ⊆ [0, 1].
An accuracy profile is a distribution of scores for a calibrated classifier Sˆ. Because Sˆ is cali-
brated, the AP conveys information about the performance of Sˆ, and is constrained by properties
of the underlying distribution on X. For example, the AP’s expectation is exactly the base rate
for the population:
Proposition 2.1. For any groupwise calibrated soft classifier Sˆ, for all groups g ∈ G: BRg =
E[Sˆ(Xg)].
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Proof of Proposition 2.1.
BRg = Pr[Y (Xg) = 1]
=
∑
s∈Supp(Pˆg)
Pr[Y (Xg) = 1 | Sˆ(Xg) = s] Pr[Sˆ(Xg) = s]
=
∑
s∈Supp(Pˆg)
sPr[Sˆ(Xg) = s]
= E[Sˆ(Xg)]
where the third line follows from the definition of a calibrated classifier (Definition 2.3).
Accuracy profiles also provide useful geometric intuition for reasoning about the effects of post-
processing calibrated scores. We elaborate on this in Section 3.1 (see Figure 2).
2.3 Group Fairness Measures
Several well-studied measures of statistical “fairness” (e.g., [HPS16, Cho17, KMR16, PRW+17,
HKRR17, KNRW18]) look at how the following key performance measures of a classifier differ
across groups. The false positive rate (FPR) of a hard classifier Yˆ for a group g is the rate at which
Yˆ gives a positive classification among instances x ∈ Xg with true type 0. The false negative rate
(FNR) is defined analogously for predicted negative instances with true type 1. Positive predictive
value (PPV) and negative predictive value (NPV) track the rate of mistakes within instances that
share a predicted type. Informally, positive predictive value captures how much meaning can be
given to a predicted 1, and negative predictive value is similar for predicted 0. We now define these
statistics formally.
Definition 2.5. Given a hard classifier Yˆ and a group g, we define
the false positive rate of Yˆ for g: FPRYˆ ,g = Pr[Yˆ (Xg) = 1 | Y (Xg) = 0];
the false negative rate of Yˆ for g: FNRYˆ ,g = Pr[Yˆ (Xg) = 0 | Y (Xg) = 1];
the positive predictive value of Yˆ for g: PPVYˆ ,g = Pr[Y (Xg) = 1 | Yˆ (Xg) = 1];
the negative predictive value of Yˆ for g: NPVYˆ ,g = Pr[Y (Xg) = 0 | Yˆ (Xg) = 0].
The probability statements in the definitions above reflect two sources of randomness: the
sampling of Xg from the group g and any random choices made by the classifier Yˆ .
Among previous works, some [HPS16, KMR16] focus on equalizing only one or both of the
false positive rates and false negative rates across groups, called balance for the negative and
positive classes, respectively. Equalizing positive and negative predictive value across groups is
often combined into one condition called predictive parity [Cho17]. We split the value out to be
a separate condition for the positive and negative predictive classes. Predictive parity appears
to be a hard-classifier analogue of calibration: both can be interpreted as saying that the output
of the classifier (hard or soft) contains all the information contained in group membership. Our
results highlight that the relationship between these notions is more subtle than it first appears;
see Section 3 for further discussion.
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3 The Limits of Post-Processing
Suppose throughout this section that Sˆ is a groupwise calibrated soft classifier. Our goal in this
section is to make binary predictions based on Sˆ(x) — and possibly the group G(x) — subject to
equalizing PPV and/or NPV among groups. That is, we wish to make a prediction using a hard
post-processor Dˆ such that Yˆ = Dˆ ◦ Sˆ equalizes PPV and/or NPV among groups. We chose to
concentrate first on (the limitations of) equalizing PPV and NPV rather than FPR and FNR due
to the conceptual similarity of PPV and NPV to calibration. Also, the case of equalizing false
positive rates with thresholds is addressed in [CPF+17].
3.1 Fairness Conditions for Post-Processors
We begin by making a simple observation about post-processing that provides some geometric
intuition for the rest of this section. Just as in Proposition 2.1, we can express PPVYˆ ,g and NPVYˆ ,g
succinctly in terms of conditional expectations over the AP Pˆg.
Proposition 3.1. Let Yˆ = Dˆ ◦ Sˆ be a hard classifier that is non-trivial for all g ∈ G where Sˆ is
groupwise calibrated with respect to G. For any g ∈ G we have:
PPVYˆ ,g = E[Sˆ(Xg) | Yˆ (Xg) = 1]
NPVYˆ ,g = 1− E[Sˆ(Xg) | Yˆ (Xg) = 0]
Proof of Proposition 3.1. We first observe that the output of a post-processor is conditionally in-
dependent of the true type, conditioned on the output of the soft classifier it is post-processing and
the group membership:
Fact 3.1. Consider any randomized function Dˆ : [0, 1] × G → {0, 1}. Since Dˆ is a randomized
function with inputs s ∈ [0, 1] and g ∈ G, we have that
(Dˆ(Sˆ(X), G(X)) ⊥ Y (X)) | (Sˆ(X), G(X)) (2)
or in other words that Dˆ(Sˆ(X), G(X)) is conditionally independent of the true type Y (X), since
fixing the inputs to Dˆ makes its output purely a function of its random string.
Now recall that PPVYˆ ,g and NPVYˆ ,g are well-defined for all groups because Yˆ is non-trivial on
all groups. We then have
PPVYˆ ,g = Pr[Y (Xg) = 1 | Yˆ (Xg) = 1]
=
∑
s∈Supp(Pˆg)
Pr[Y (Xg) = 1, Sˆ(Xg) = s | Dˆ(Sˆ(Xg), g) = 1]
=
∑
s∈Supp(Pˆg)
Pr[Y (Xg) = 1 | Sˆ(Xg) = s, Dˆ(Sˆ(Xg), g)]
· Pr[Sˆ(Xg) = s|Dˆ(Sˆ(Xg), g) = 1]
=
∑
s∈Supp(Pˆg)
sPr[Sˆ(Xg) = s|Dˆ(Sˆ(Xg), g) = 1]
= E[Sˆ(Xg) | Yˆ (Xg) = 1]
10
Figure 2: Accuracy Profiles (APs, definition 2.4) yield useful geometric intuitions, which come from the calibration
property (definition 2.2). With a threshold, the expected PPV, NPV, FPR, and FNR can be seen visually.
where the fourth line follows from the fact that the group g is fixed within Xg, which lets us apply
Fact 3.1, and the fact that Sˆ is calibrated on g. Similar simplifications give us that
NPVYˆ ,g = Pr[Y (Xg) = 0 | Dˆ(Sˆ(Xg), g) = 0]
= 1− Pr[Y (Xg) = 1 | Dˆ(Sˆ(Xg), g) = 0]
= 1− E[Sˆ(Xg) | Dˆ(Sˆ(Xg), g) = 0]
Using Proposition 3.1, we can geometrically see how certain post-processing decision rules will
interact with the AP for a group g. For example, using a threshold, the expected true positives,
true negatives, false positives, and false negatives can be estimated, as shown in Figure 2.
Proposition 3.2 below gives a characterizations of the false positive and false negative rates in
a manner analogous to how Proposition 3.1 describes PPV and NPV:
Proposition 3.2. Let Yˆ and Sˆ be hard and soft classifiers as in Proposition 3.1. Then for any
g ∈ G,
FPRYˆ ,g = Pr[Yˆ (Xg) = 1] ·
1− E[Sˆ(Xg) | Yˆ (Xg) = 1]
1− E[Sˆ(Xg)]
FNRYˆ ,g = Pr[Yˆ (Xg) = 0] ·
E[Sˆ(Xg) | Yˆ (Xg) = 0]
E[Sˆ(Xg)]
Assume that Pr[Y (Xg) = 1] > 0 and Pr[Y (Xg) = 0] > 0 (that is, assume 0 < BRg < 1) so that
FPR and FNR are well-defined.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. We give the proof for FPR, and the proof for FNR is similar. By applying
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Bayes’ rule, we can write
FPRYˆ ,g = Pr[Yˆ (Xg) = 1 | Y (Xg) = 0]
= Pr[Y (Xg) = 0 | Yˆ (Xg) = 1] · Pr[Yˆ (Xg) = 1]
Pr[Y (Xg) = 0]
(3)
Noting that Pr[Y (Xg) = 0 | Yˆ (Xg) = 1] = 1−PPVYˆ ,g, we can apply Proposition 3.1 and rearrange
to write the RHS of Equation 3 as follows.
RHS of (3) = Pr[Yˆ (Xg) = 1] · 1− E[Sˆ(Xg) | Yˆ (Xg) = 1]
Pr[Y (Xg) = 0]
(4)
We note that Pr[Y (Xg) = 0] = 1− E[Sˆ(Xg)] (Proposition 2.1). Substituting this in to the RHS of
Equation 4, we conclude the result.
3.2 General impossibility of equalizing PPV, NPV
It is not always possible to directly post-process a soft groupwise calibrated classifier into a hard
one with equalized PPV (or NPV) for all groups, as we demonstrate by counterexample in Proposi-
tion 3.3. Before proceeding, we note that our counterexample is somewhat contrived—in particular,
the AP induced by the soft classifier Sˆ in the proof of Proposition 3.3 takes only one value on each
group. When the AP of Sˆ is more nicely structured on each group, we will see that there are
general methods to equalize PPV (or NPV).
Proposition 3.3. Fix two disjoint groups g1 and g2 with respective base rates BR1 and BR2 such
that BR1 6= BR2. Then there exists a soft classifier Sˆ that is groupwise calibrated, but for which there
is no post-processor Dˆ : [0, 1]× G → {0, 1} such that Dˆ ◦ Sˆ equalizes PPV, unless Pr[Dˆ(BRi, gi) =
1] = 0 for i = 1 or 2.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. Consider the classifier Sˆ such that Sˆ(x) = BR1 if x ∈ g1 and Sˆ(x) = BR2
if x ∈ g2. This classifier is trivially groupwise calibrated. Since Pr[Dˆ(BRi, gi) = 1] > 0 for i = 1
and 2, we conclude that PPVYˆ ,gi is well-defined for g1 and g2. The proof now follows from the
characterization of PPV in Proposition 3.1. This is because PPVYˆ ,gi is equal to the expectation of
Sˆ(X) where X is drawn from a distribution with support contained in gi, and hence it is equal to
BRi, and BR1 6= BR2.
The analogous statement regarding impossibility of equalizing NPV is formulated as Proposi-
tion A.1 in Appendix A.1.
3.3 A niceness Condition for APs
We now give a non-degeneracy condition condition on APs motivated by the impossibility result
for post-processing given by Proposition 3.3.
Definition 3.1 (Niceness of APs). Let G be a set of groups. A distribution on calibrated scores Pˆ
is nice if Supp(Pˆg) is the same for all g ∈ G.
Note that this condition rules out the counterexample given by Proposition 3.3, since the APs
in the counterexample had different (in fact, disjoint) supports for different groups. Hence, we can
hope to successfully post-process soft classifiers with nice APs.
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3.4 Equalizing PPV or NPV by Thresholding
We pay special attention to thresholds because they are simple to understand and therefore very
widely used. We use one slight modification to deterministic thresholds that adds an element of
randomness: if a score is at the threshold, we randomly determine which side of the threshold it
falls on, according to a distribution defined below.
Definition 3.2 (Threshold Post-Processor). A threshold post-processor Dˆ(τ,R) : [0, 1]×G → {1, 0}
is a function from a score s ∈ [0, 1] and a group g ∈ G, parameterized by τ and R. The threshold
parameter τ : G → [0, 1] specifies the threshold for the group g, and R : G → [0, 1] is the probability
of returning 1 when the input score s is on the threshold τ(g). It returns the following outputs:
Dˆ(τ,R)(s, g) =

1 s > τ(g)
0 s < τ(g)
1 w.p. R(g) else 0 s = τ(g)
In the setting of an infinite number of scores and a continuous domain (i.e. scores are repre-
sented by a probability density function instead of a probability mass function), we can use purely
deterministic threshold functions in which R ≡ 1, and achieve very similar results for the rest of
this section.
If both τ(g) and R(g) do not vary across groups g ∈ G, then the post-processor is the same
across groups. In this case, we will call the post-processor a group blind threshold post-processor,
and will overload τ and R to be constants.
We now study the effectiveness of thresholds for post-processing soft classifiers with nice APs.
The main takeaways are:
1. If the APs are nice, then threshold post-processors can equalize PPV (Propositions 3.4
and 3.6).
2. However, group blind threshold post-processors are rather limited in their ability to equalize
PPV (Proposition 3.5).
3. Furthermore, equalizing PPV with thresholds (group blind or otherwise) may have undesirable
social consequences.
4. Thresholds cannot always equalize PPV and NPV simultaneously, even for nice APs (Propo-
sition 3.7).
Results 1-3 also apply to NPV (see Proposition A.3).
3.4.1 Group Blind Thresholds
We begin by classifying which group-blind threshold post-processors can equalize PPVs across all
groups (Propositions 3.4 and 3.5). By symmetry, our arguments give a similar characterization for
equalizing NPVs.
Proposition 3.4. For every nice groupwise calibrated soft classifier Sˆ and for every group-blind
threshold post-processor Dˆ(τ,R) such that τ(g) = max(Supp(Pˆg)) for all g, then the composed clas-
sifier Yˆ = Dˆ(τ,R) ◦ Sˆ equalizes PPVs across all groups for which Yˆ is non-trivial.
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The existence of the threshold post-processors in Proposition 3.4 follows from the assumed
finiteness of the range of the soft classifier. In the case where the range of the soft classifier is
infinite, such post-processors may not exist.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. Any of the given post-processors only ever maps the largest score in the
support of Pˆg to 1, for all groups g. Hence, PPVg is exactly the largest score in Supp(Pˆg). By the
assumption that Pˆ is nice, Supp(Pˆg) is the same for all groups g, and hence the PPV is equalized
across groups.
We prove the analogous statement for NPV in Proposition A.2 in the Appendix. We proceed
to show that the post-processors described in Proposition 3.4 are the only non-trivial, group blind
post-processors that equalize PPV across groups in general, as we prove in Proposition 3.5.
Proposition 3.5. There exists a groupwise-calibrated soft classifier with a nice AP for which no
non-trivial group blind threshold post-processor, other than the ones in Proposition 3.4, can equalize
PPV across groups.
At a high level, the proof of Proposition 3.5 works as follows: We can make the AP on one
group uniform, and the AP of another group strictly increasing. Then, threshold post-processors
naturally favor the latter group, as the AP for that group gives more weight to higher scores
than lower ones when compared to the former AP. Our characterization of PPV (Proposition 3.1)
features prominently in the proof.
In preparation to proving Proposition 3.5, we first prove the following lemma:
Lemma 3.1. Let g1, g2 ∈ G be two different groups, and fix a group-blind threshold post-processor
Dˆ(τ,R). Let Pˆg1,(τ,R) be the expected conditional AP on scores ≥ τ that results from starting with the
AP Pˆg1 over scores in group g1 and conditioning on the scores that Dˆ(τ,R) sends to 1, and similarly
let Pˆg2,(τ,R) denote the same type of conditional AP when starting with the Pˆg2 over scores in group
g2.
If Pˆg2,(τ,R) strictly stochastically dominates Pˆg1,(τ,R), then
PPVDˆ(τ,R)◦Sˆ,g1 < PPVDˆ(τ,R)◦Sˆ,g2
Proof. We use the characterization of PPV given in Proposition 3.1, for the special case where the
post-processor thresholds as described above. We can write the PPV for group g1 as follows:
PPVDˆ(τ,R)◦Sˆ,g1 = EX1∼Xg1
[Sˆ(X1) | Dˆ(τ,R) ◦ Sˆ(X1) = 1]
= E
s∼Pˆg1,(τ,R)
[s] (5)
where the second line follows from the definition of Pˆg1,(τ,R).
Similarly, we have that
PPVDˆ(τ,R)◦Sˆ,g2 = E
s∼Pˆg2,(τ,R)
[s] (6)
Since Pˆg2,(τ,R) stochastically dominates Pˆg1,(τ,R), the expectation on the RHS of Equation 6 is
larger than the expectation on the RHS of Equation 5, yielding the result.
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Proof of Proposition 3.5. Fix two groups g1 and g2 and a finite set of points S ⊂ [0, 1] such that
the PMFs of the soft classifier Sˆ on g1 and g2 have support equal to S - that is, Supp(Pˆg1) =
Supp(Pˆg2) = S. For concreteness, suppose that |S| = 10.
Let the PMFs of the soft classifier Sˆ on these two groups respectively be given by Pˆg1(s) =
1/|Supp(Pˆg1)| and Pˆg2(s) ∝ s for all s ∈ S, where Pˆg2 is normalized with a constant such that it
sums to 1. Fix a group blind threshold post-processor Dˆ(τ,R) that is not one of the ones mentioned
in Proposition 3.4. Since Sˆ(τ,R) is group blind, its threshold function is a constant which we name τ .
Let Pˆg1,(τ,R) be the expected conditional AP on scores ≥ τ that results from starting with the
AP Pˆg1 over scores in group g1 and conditioning on the scores that Dˆ(τ,R) sends to 1. We can get
this conditional PMF by removing scores s < τ , multiplying Pˆg1(τ) by R, and re-normalizing the
remaining values to get a distribution. Let Pˆg2,(τ,R) be defined similarly.
We claim that Pˆg2,(τ,R) strictly stochastically dominates Pˆg1,(τ,R), which allows us to invoke
Lemma 3.1 to conclude that the PPV on the two groups are unequal. We now show that Pˆg2,(τ,R)
strictly stochastically dominates Pˆg1,(τ,R). This is clearly true by design if R = 0 or 1: in this
case, the post-processor is simply a deterministic threshold function, and we know by design that
Pˆg1,(τ,R) is uniform while Pˆg2,(τ,R) is a strictly increasing function. If R = r for some r ∈ (0, 1),
then we can write Pˆg1,(τ,R) as a convex combination of Pˆg1,τ,0 and Pˆg1,τ,1 (with weight r on the
distribution where R = 1, and weight 1 − r on the distribution where R = 0). We can write
Pˆg2,(τ,R) as the same convex combination of the conditional distributions over g2 where R = 0 and
R = 1. Since we already established stochastic domination for the cases where R = 0 and R = 1,
this establishes stochastic domination for the case where R ∈ (0, 1).
We achieve the same result for NPV in Proposition A.3. In the setting where the range of the
soft classifier is infinite and continuous, we show in Proposition A.5 that a similar negative result
holds, but without the existence of the classifiers in Proposition 3.4.
Propositions 3.4 and 3.5 demonstrate the limitations of group blind thresholds on calibrated
scores. Though this method of post-processing has social appeal, it does not actually preserve the
fairness properties that one would expect. In the next section we repeat our analysis but relax our
group blindness requirement.
3.4.2 Group-Aware Thresholds
If we allow the different groups to have different thresholds, then we grant ourselves more degrees
of freedom to be able to satisfy binary fairness constraints. In particular, we can equalize PPV
across groups in a more meaningful way than done in Proposition 3.4.
Recall that the group blind threshold post-processors in Proposition 3.4 are the only group
blind threshold post-processors that work on certain nice APs (shown in Proposition 3.5). However,
these post-processors have the property that the only score they map to 1 is the largest score in
the support, which can be undesirable for many applications.
In particular, all classifiers in Proposition 3.5 make the PPV on each group gi equal to the
maximum score in the support of Pˆgi . However, the (not-necessarily-group-blind) threshold post-
processors in Proposition 3.6 below can make the PPV on each group equal to any fixed value
between the maximum base rate of gi and the maximum score in Supp(Pˆgi).
Proposition 3.6. Let G be a set of groups. For any soft classifier Sˆ with a nice AP Pˆ such that
Sˆ is groupwise calibrated over G and |Supp(Pˆg)| ≥ 2 for all g ∈ G, then there exists a non group
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blind, non-trivial threshold post-processor Dˆ(τ,R) that is not one of the ones from Proposition 3.4
such that the hard classifier Yˆ = Dˆ(τ,R) ◦ Sˆ equalizes PPV across G.
This holds even if we require that the PPV of all the groups is equal to an arbitrary value in
(maxi BRgi , smax), where maxi BRgi is the maximum base rate among the groups gi ∈ G and smax
is the maximum score in the support of Pˆgi.2
Moreover, since this post-processor is not group blind, it is not one of the post-processors de-
scribed in Proposition 3.4.
In preparation to proving Proposition 3.6, we first prove the following claim:
Claim 3.1 (Monotonicity of PPV and NPV). Fix a soft classifier Sˆ and corresponding AP Pˆ, as
well as a group g. Fix group blind threshold post-processors Dˆτ1,R1 and Dˆτ2,R2 such that either
τ1 < τ2 or τ1 = τ2 and R1 ≥ R2. Then:
(a) PPVDˆτ1,R1◦Sˆ,g
≤ PPVDˆτ2,R2◦Sˆ,g
(b) NPVDˆτ1,R1◦Sˆ,g
≤ NPVDˆτ2,R2◦Sˆ,g
Proof. We show conclusion (a); conclusion (b) is shown analogously. Define Pˆg,τ1,R1 to be the
conditional PMF on scores ≥ τ1 that results from starting with the AP Pˆg over scores in group g
and conditioning on the scores that Dˆτ1,R1 sends to 1, and let Pˆg,τ2,R2 be defined similarly (but for
the threshold post-processor Dˆτ2,R2).
We claim that Pˆg,τ2,R2 stochastically dominates Pˆg,τ1,R1 , which yields the desired result by
the characterization of PPV given in Proposition 3.1 (and more explicitly written in Equations 5
and 6).
Proof of Proposition 3.6. Fix a soft classifier Sˆ with a nice AP Pˆ that is group-wise calibrated
over g1, . . . , gn, and fix a desired value v ∈ (maxi BRgi , smax). We will show that we can design a
threshold post-processor (τ,R) such that PPVg,Dˆ(τ,R)◦Sˆ = v for all groups g.
Fix an arbitrary group gj . We proceed via a continuity argument to show that we can tune the
threshold on gj to achieve PPV equal to v. The maximum possible value for PPVgj ,Dˆ(τ,R)
is smax
(achieved when τ = smax, by Claim 3.1), where smax is the largest score in the support, as defined
in the proposition statement3.
Furthermore, note that, for any group, a lower bound on the PPV of a hard classifier on that
group is the base rate of the group, where the lower bound is matched by the trivial post-processor
that sends every score to 1. This follows from Claim 3.1.
We now claim that there is a setting of τ(gj) and R(gj) that achieves PPVg,Dˆ(τ,R)◦Sˆ = v. We
accomplish this by showing that there is a way to change (τ(gj),R(gj)) such that the PPV decreases
continuously. We first show:
Claim 3.2 (Continuity of PPV). Fix a soft classifier Sˆ and corresponding AP Pˆ, as well as a
group g. Suppose we have two post-processing algorithms, Dˆ1 and Dˆ2. Let Pˆg,Dˆ1 be the expected
conditional AP that results from starting with the AP Pˆg over scores in group g and conditioning
on the scores that Dˆ1 sends to 1, and define Pˆg,Dˆ2 similarly. If dTV (Pˆg,Dˆ1 , Pˆg,Dˆ2) < , then|PPVg,Dˆ1◦Sˆ−PPVg,Dˆ2◦Sˆ | < O(). Or in words, if the distance between the conditional APs is small,
then the difference in PPV is small.
2For the case where the support of Pˆgi is infinite, smax should be the supremum of scores.
3We ignore the trivial post-processor that never maps anything to 1, and hence leaves the PPV undefined.
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Proof. Recall the characterization of PPV given in Proposition 3.1 (and more explicitly written in
Equation 5). This tells us that the PPV of group g for the classifier Dˆ1◦Sˆ is exactly the expectation
of a random variable distributed according to Pˆg,Dˆ1 . Similarly, the PPV of group g for the classifier
Dˆ2 ◦ Sˆ is the expectation of a r.v. distributed according to Pˆg,Dˆ2 . Since both Pˆg,Dˆ1 and Pˆg,Dˆ2 have
support bounded between 0 and 1, their expectations can differ by at most , from which the claim
follows. For completeness, we prove this below.
Suppose wlog that Pˆg,Dˆ1 has the larger expectation. Let S = {s ∈ Supp(Pˆg) : Pˆg,Dˆ1(s) >
Pˆg,Dˆ2(s)}. Then:
PPVg,Dˆ1◦Sˆ =
∑
s∈Supp(Pˆg)
sPˆg,Dˆ1(s)
= PPVg,Dˆ2◦Sˆ +
∑
s∈S
s(Pˆg,Dˆ1(s)− Pˆg,Dˆ2(s))
< PPVg,Dˆ2◦Sˆ + 
where in the second line we use the fact that PPVg,Dˆ2◦Sˆ is the expectation of Pˆg,Dˆ2 , and in the last
line we use the fact that s ∈ [0, 1] and that the TV-distance between the two distributions is less
than .
Now, consider the following way to change (τ(gj),R(gj)). Fix  > 0, and an initial setting for
(τ(gj),R(gj)) s.t. τ(gj) is not the smallest item in the support or R(gj) > . Reduce R(gj) by ,
wrapping around on the interval (0, 1] and decreasing τ(gj) to the next largest item in the support
when this would otherwise make R(gj) negative.
This very minor transformation to the threshold changes the AP conditional on outputting 1
very slightly - so slightly that the TV distance between the old conditional AP and the new AP is
at most some ′ which is a function of . This lets us apply Claim 3.2 to show that the PPV changes
by at most a function of . So as we take  going towards 0, this shows that the PPV changes by
an amount going towards 0. This establishes that the PPV changes “continuously” with respect to
this deforming procedure.
By Claim 3.1, we have that the above deforming procedure can only decrease the PPV. There-
fore, we can continuously decrease the PPV, starting from smax, by continuously deforming the
threshold post-processor with the method above. Note that smax > v > maxi BRgi ≥ BRgj . By the
Intermediate Value Theorem, there must be a setting of (τ(gj),R(gj)) such that PPVgj ,Dˆ(τ,R)◦Sˆ = v.
We assert the analogous statement for the case of NPV in Claim A.1. The corresponding
statement for the case of soft classifiers with infinite range is asserted in Proposition A.6.
3.4.3 The Limitations of Thresholding
While Proposition 3.6 shows that a threshold post-processor can equalize the PPV across n groups,
this threshold post-processor can be unsatisfying from a social justice standpoint. Consider an
example with two groups g1 and g2, where group g2 is “privileged” by having a higher base rate
of, say, credit worthiness. Suppose that we have an AP that is decreasing with respect to score
on group g1, and increasing with respect to score on group g2. This is illustrated in Example 3.1
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Figure 3: Accompanying Example 3.1, the PPV for both groups is 0.77. However, the threshold for g1 (dark blue) is
higher than the threshold for g2 (orange), even though g2 is likely the more privileged group.
and Figure 3. This means that a group blind threshold post-processor yields larger PPV on g2,
since large scores are given more weight in g2. So, to equalize the PPV between the two groups,
we will classify more low scores as positive in g2 than g1. This effectively means that our threshold
on group g2 is more lenient than our threshold on g1, which seems blatantly unfair, since g2 is the
privileged group in the first place!
Example 3.1 (Socially Unsatisfying Example). Fix groups g1 and g2, and we fix the AP of the
soft classifier Sˆ as follows. Let Supp(Pˆgi) be {0, 0.01, 0.02, . . . , 1) for i = 1 and 2, let Pˆg1(s) ∝ a− s
for appropriately selected constant a > 0 and let Pˆg2(s) ∝ s. Group g2 has a higher base rate and
may have social advantages over group g1.
Let Dˆ(τ,R) be a non-trivial post-processor. If Dˆ(τ,R) were group blind, then by Lemma 3.1, since
Pˆg2,Dˆ(τ,R) stochastically dominates Pˆg1,Dˆ(τ,R), the PPV on g2 must be larger than the PPV of g1.
To equalize PPV, by Claim 3.1, we must have either τ(g2) < τ(g1), or τ(g2) = τ(g1) and
R(g2) < R(g1). The disadvantaged group is now held to a higher standard than the privileged
group to maintain equality of PPV. Figure 3 illustrates example thresholds that equalize the PPV.
The only property needed for Example 3.1 is that the AP of one (privileged) group stochastically
dominates the AP of another (unprivileged) group. We suspect that this to will occur in many
settings. Indeed, the COMPAS scores we analyze in Section 5 have this property, when considering
Caucasians as the privileged group and African-Americans the unprivileged group. As in the
above example, using group-aware thresholds to equalize PPV between the groups on COMPAS
data results in a more permissive decision rule for Caucasians, demonstrating a problem with this
approach (see also Figure 7).
Furthermore, thresholding cannot in general equalize both PPV and NPV simultaneously, even
for nice APs and using non-group blind thresholds.
Proposition 3.7. Fix groups g1 and g2. There exists a soft classifier Sˆ with a nice AP Pˆ such
that no threshold post-processor can simultaneously equalize PPV and NPV between groups g1 and
g2.
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Before proving the statement, we first show that the base rates of g1 and g2 can be written as
convex combinations of the PPV and 1− NPV on the respective groups:
Claim 3.3. Fix any group g ∈ G, and let the hard classifier Yˆ be non-trivial. Then the base rate
of g can be written as a convex combination of PPVg,Yˆ and 1− NPVg,Yˆ
Proof.
BRg = Pr[Y (Xg) = 1]
= Pr[Y (Xg) = 1 | Yˆ (Xg) = 1] Pr[Yˆ (Xg) = 1]
+ Pr[Y (Xg) = 1 | Yˆ (Xg) = 0] Pr[Yˆ (Xg) = 0]
= PPVg,Yˆ · θ + (1− NPVg,Yˆ ) · (1− θ)
where θ := Pr[Yˆ (Xg) = 1].
A simple intuition for the proof of Proposition 3.7 is as follows. Suppose we have two groups,
and the soft classifier is almost perfect on one group - for all but a small fraction of people, it gives
the correct binary score, and gives the remaining people score 0.5. On the other group, it is the
opposite - almost every person is given score 0.5, and there are only a few people given their ground
truth score. The corresponding APs of each group have equal supports, and therefore are “nice.”
However, it is clear that any threshold post-processor on the first group will have extremely high
PPV and NPV, while any threshold post-processor on the second group will have to make decision
on where to round the people in the 0.5 bucket, and will correspondingly either have low PPV or
NPV.
This example is somewhat unsatisfying, as the AP satisfies niceness by a technicality (for
example, it is extremely close to a AP with disjoint supports between groups). The proof generalizes
the above example to a case where scores for one group are slightly more “correlated” with the
ground truth labels than scores for the other group. Appendix A.2 shows the corresponding result
when the range of the soft classifier is infinite.
Proof of Proposition 3.7. Let Supp(Pˆgi) be {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9} for i = 1 and 2. Let Pˆg1 be uniform
over scores, and let Pˆg2(s) = −a(s − 1/2)2 + b for some appropriately chosen constants a, b ≥ 0
such that Pˆg2 is a valid probability distribution.
We claim that there is no threshold post-processor that can equalize PPV and NPV simul-
taneously for these two groups. First, note that the base rates for the two groups are equal to
1/2 by design, due to the symmetric nature of the AP on each group. Just like in the proof of
Proposition 3.5, we use the notation Pˆg1,≥(τ,R) to denote the conditional AP supported on scores
≥ τ that results from starting with the AP Pˆg1 over all scores in group g1 and conditioning on the
scores that Dˆ(τ,R) sends to 1, and define Pˆg2,≥(τ,R) similarly. Let Pˆgi,≤(τ,R) denote the conditional
AP starting from group gi and conditioning on the scores that Dˆ(τ,R) sends to 0.
We proceed by a case analysis on the location of the threshold for group g1 - that is, on τ(g1).
Case 1: τ(g1) ≥ 1/2. First, suppose additionally that Dˆ(τ,R) is group blind over g1, g2, then
Pˆg2,(τ,R) is strictly stochastically dominated by Pˆg1,(τ,R) so the PPV is lower on g2 than g1 (Lemma 3.1).
Therefore, to equalize the PPV between the two groups, the threshold on group g2 must be to the
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“right” of the threshold on g1 (that is, either τ(g2) > τ(g1) or τ(g2) = τ(g1) and R(g2) < R(g1)),
which follows from Claim 3.1.
However, we claim that this setting of thresholds makes the NPV on group g2 lower than the
NPV on group g1. It suffices to show that, for any constant threshold post-processor classifier Dˆ(τ,R)
with τ(g1) = τ(g2) ≥ 1/2, the NPV on group g2 is lower than the NPV on group g1. This implies
that the same statement holds when either τ(g2) > τ(g1) or τ(g2) = τ(g1) and R(g2) < R(g1) as
well, due to the monotonicity property of NPV (Claim 3.1). This suffices to prove Proposition 3.7
for the case when τ(g1) ≥ 1/2: we need to set τ(g2),R(g2) such that either τ(g2) > τ(g1) or
τ(g2) = τ(g1) and R(g2) < R(g1) in order to equalize PPV, but this leaves the NPV on group g2
lower than the NPV on group g1.
Now we proceed to show that the NPV is lower on g2 when the threshold post-processor is
constant. Fix a constant threshold post-processor Dˆ(τ,R) with τ ≥ 1/2. We have already established
that this means that PPVg2,Dˆ(τ,R)◦Sˆ < PPVg1,Dˆ(τ,R)◦Sˆ .
Now, since the base rates of g1 and g2 are equal, this implies that
1− NPVg2,Dˆ(τ,R)◦Sˆ > 1− NPVg1,Dˆ(τ,R)◦Sˆ
Rearranging, this shows that NPVg2,Dˆ(τ,R)◦Sˆ < NPVg1,Dˆ(τ,R)◦Sˆ , finishing the proof of this case.
Case 2: τ(g1) < 1/2. The argument in this case is symmetrical to the previous case, where we
switch the roles of PPV and NPV in the argument. We sketch it for the sake of completeness.
Fix a constant threshold post-processor such that τ(g1) = τ(g2) < 1/2. By design, Pˆg2,≤(τ,R)
strictly stochastically dominates Pˆg1,≤(τ,R). Hence, the NPV on group g2 is smaller than the NPV
on group g1 (this follows from an analogous version of Lemma 3.1 for NPV instead of PPV). This
means that the threshold post-processor cannot be constant to equalize NPVs - it must be moved
such that either τ(g2) < τ(g1) or τ(g2) = τ(g1) and R(g2) > R(g1) (Claim 3.1).
However, by the same convex combination argument as in the previous case, we get that any
such constant threshold post-processor must make the PPV on g2 strictly smaller than the PPV
on g1. By the monotonicity of PPV, this means that any threshold post-processor with either
τ(g2) < τ(g1) or τ(g2) = τ(g1) and R(g2) > R(g1) must also make the PPV on g2 smaller than the
PPV on g1, finishing the proof.
3.5 Equalizing APs
While thresholding is a conceptually simple approach to post-processing a soft classifier, its power
is limited. We now consider a very different approach using soft post-processors to equalize the
APs across groups of a soft classifier. The intuition is that if the APs are equal across groups, then
any hard post-processor that is group blind should result in equal PPV, NPV, FPR, and FNR. We
formalize this intuition in Claim 3.4.
Let Sˆ be a soft classifier and for each group g ∈ G, let Pˆg be the AP of Sˆ for group g. For a
soft post-processor Dˆsoft, let Sˆ′ = Dˆsoft ◦ Sˆ and let Pˆ ′g be the corresponding AP for group g.
Our goal is to find a soft post-processor Dˆsoft such that Sˆ′ is groupwise calibrated, and Pˆ ′g = Pˆ ′g′
for all g, g′ ∈ G. In this section, we describe only one approach to constructing Dˆsoft which we call
mass averaging.
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The approach of equalizing APs has a fundamental weakness: if Pˆ ′g = Pˆ ′g′ and both are cal-
ibrated, then BRg = BRg′ . This severely limits applicability of this approach. However, this
limitation will removed in Section 4.2 by allowing deferrals.
Claim 3.4. If the APs are equal for two groups, then PPV, NPV, FPR, and FNR are equalized
by any hard post-processor Dˆ satisfying group blindness.
The group-blindness requirement in the claim is necessary: consider the (not group blind)
post-processor that outputs 0 on one group and 1 on the other; PPV will not be equalized.
Proof of Claim: 3.4. We prove only that PPV is equalized; the remaining properties may be proved
similarly. Let Yˆ = Dˆ ◦ Sˆ be a hard classifier Yˆ that is a group blind post-processor Dˆ composed
with a calibrated soft classifier Sˆ. All probabilities below are over Xg ∼ Xg, and the coins of Sˆ and
Dˆ.
PPVYˆ ,g = Pr[Y (Xg) = 1 | Yˆ (Xg, g) = 1]
=
Pr[Y (X) = 1]
Pr[Yˆ (Xg, g) = 1]
·
∑
s∈Supp(Pˆg)
(
Pr[Y (Xg) = 1 | Sˆ(Xg) = s] · Pr[Sˆ(Xg) = s]
Pr[Y (Xg) = 1]
· Pr[Yˆ (Xg, g) = 1 | Sˆ(Xg) = s, Y (Xg) = 1]
)
Each factor in this product is equal across groups by the assumptions. Namely, Pr[Y (Xg) = 1]
is equalized by calibration and equalized APs; Pr[Yˆ (Xg, g) = 1] by group blindness and equalized
APs; Pr[Yˆ (Xg, g) = 1 | Sˆ(Xg) = s, Y (Xg) = 1] by group blindness; Pr[Y (Xg) = 1 | Sˆ(Xg) = s] by
calibration; and finally Pr[Sˆ(Xg) = s] by equalized APs.
3.5.1 Mass Averaging
The mass-averaging technique is best illustrated with an example. Suppose that Pˆg1 is uniform
over {0, 0.5, 1}, and Pˆg2 is uniform over {0, 1}. It is easy to define a soft post-processor Dˆsoft which
equalizes these two APs. On g1, we leave the score unchanged: Dˆ
soft(s, g1) = s. On g2, we compute
the output as
Dˆsoft(s, g2) =
{
s w.p. 2/3
0.5 w.p. 1/3
.
The APs for groups g1 and g2 of the resulting soft classifier Sˆ
′ = Dˆsoft ◦ Sˆ are equal, and are equal
to Pˆg1 .
In the example, the probability mass is being redistributed by averaging the scores. This can
be equivalently viewed as adding noise to the scores and then recalibrating the scores, something
discussed in [CPF+17].
More generally, a mass-averaging post processor Dˆsoft assigns to each possible pair (s, g) a
distribution over possible output scores s′. Such a Dˆsoft is fully specified by k · k′ · |G| parameters,
where k is the number of possible values of s and k′ is the number of possible values of s′. Given
a soft classifier Sˆ and a mass-averaging post processor Dˆsoft, the constraint that the resulting APs
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are equalized across groups is linear in these parameters. Such classifiers, therefore, may be found
by a linear program. We do not explore the choice of mass-averaging post-processors further.
4 Post-Processing Calibrated Classifiers with Deferrals
In the first part of the paper, we considered the problem of post-processing calibrated soft classifiers,
which output a score s ∈ [0, 1], into fair hard classifiers, which output a decision in yˆ ∈ {0, 1},
subject to a number of group fairness conditions. In the remainder of this work, we reconsider this
problem, but with one important change: we allow classifiers to “refuse to decide” by outputting
the special symbol ⊥. We call such classifiers deferring classifiers, borrowing the nomenclature
from [MPZ17]. The output ⊥ is the deferring classifier’s way of refusing to make a decision and
deferring to a downstream decision maker. For example, a risk assessment tool might aid a parole
board to make a decision by categorizing an individual as high risk or low risk, or it might output
⊥—providing no advice and deferring to the judgment of the board.
We now modify our notation appropriately. Instances x are still associated with a true type
Y (x) ∈ {0, 1} and a group G(x) ∈ G. A deferring hard classifier Yˆ is a randomized function
Yˆ : X → {0, 1,⊥}. A deferring soft classifier is a randomized function Sˆ : X → [0, 1] ∪ {⊥}. A
deferring hard (resp. soft) post-processor is a randomized function Dˆ : [0, 1] ∪ {⊥} × G → {0, 1,⊥}
(resp. Dˆsoft : [0, 1] ∪ {⊥} × G → [0, 1] ∪ {⊥}) that takes as input the output of a deferring soft and
post-processes it into a deferring hard (resp. soft) classifier. We also introduce new versions of the
FPR and FNR, conditioned on not deferring.
Definition 4.1. The conditional false positive rate and conditional false negative rate of a deferring
hard classifier Yˆ for a group g are, respectively:
cFPRYˆ ,g = Pr[Yˆ (Xg) = 1 | Y (Xg) = 0, Yˆ (Xg) 6= ⊥]
cFNRYˆ ,g = Pr[Yˆ (Xg) = 0 | Y (Xg) = 1, Yˆ (Xg) 6= ⊥].
We additionally consider a version of the accuracy profile conditioned on not deferring, which
we call the conditional AP. For non-deferring soft classifiers, Definitions 4.2 and 2.4 coincide.
Definition 4.2. The conditional AP Pˆg of a classifier Sˆ for a group g is the PMF of Sˆ(Xg),
conditioned on not outputting ⊥. That is, for s ∈ [0, 1], Pˆg(s) = Pr[Sˆ(Xg) = s | Sˆ(Xg) 6= ⊥]. Note
that the conditional AP is undefined if Pr[Sˆ(Xg) 6= ⊥] = 0.
Abusing notation, we denote by Pˆ the collection {Pˆg}g∈G , and call it the conditional AP of Sˆ.
The conditional error rates are applicable generally, but they can be difficult to interpret. The
consequences of using the conditional FPR and FNR are discussed further in Section 6 along with
a discussion of different deferral models. They are also amenable to the consideration of additional
goals which we will briefly address. For example, one could seek to minimize the total deferral rate,
equalize the deferral rate among groups, or prefer deferrals on positive instances.
4.1 Thresholding with deferrals
We return now to the problem of post-processing of calibrated soft classifiers, but now with the
extra power of deferring on some inputs. We revisit the two approaches discussed in Section 3:
thresholding and equalizing APs.
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Proposition 3.3 stated PPV and NPV cannot both be equalized across groups in general when
using only a single threshold per group. By using two thresholds per groups and deferring on some
inputs, PPV and NPV can always be equalized across groups.
We post-process using two thresholds per group as follows: return 0 when s is lower than the
first threshold, return ⊥ between the thresholds, and return 1 above the second threshold, as shown
in Figure 4. This buys us more degrees of freedom when equalizing binary constraints, and it has
the useful property that we say ⊥ on the instances where we are the least confident about the
predicted type.
We adapt our notation as follows:
Definition 4.3 (Deferring Threshold Post-Processor). A deferring threshold post-processor Dˆ(τ0,τ1,R0,R1)
assigns to each group g two thresholds τ0(g), τ1(g) ∈ Supp(Pˆg), and two probabilitiesR0(g),R1(g) ∈
[0, 1], with the following requirements:
1. for all g ∈ G, τ0(g) ≤ τ1(g)
2. for all g ∈ G for which τ0(g) = τ1(g), R1(g) +R0(g) ≤ 1. This corresponds to the case where
the two thresholds are the same, and therefore individuals with that score must be mapped
to 1 with probability R1(g), and to 0 with probability R0(g), with the remainder mapped to
⊥.
The corresponding threshold post-processor is defined as follows:
Dˆ(τ0,τ1,R0,R1)(s, g) =

1 s > τ1(g)
0 s < τ0(g)
⊥ τ0(g) < s < τ1(g)
1 w.p. R1(g), else ⊥ s = τ1(g)
0 w.p. R0(g), else ⊥ s = τ0(g)
1 w.p. R1(g), 0 w.p. R0(g), else ⊥ s = τ0(g) = τ1(g)
⊥ s = ⊥
Using two thresholds allows the equalization of both PPV and NPV across groups in general,
whereas without deferrals we could only equalize one or the other. We first demonstrate the
existence of post-processors that are fairly limited, analogously to those defined in Proposition 3.4.
Proposition 4.1. Let Sˆ be a soft classifier with a nice AP for a set of groups G. Then every
threshold post-processor Dˆ(τ0,τ1,R0,R1) satisfying the following properties equalizes both the PPV
and NPV for all groups in G of the composed classifier Yˆ = Dˆ(τ0,τ1,R0,R1) ◦ Sˆ:
1. τ0(g) = min(Supp(Pˆg)) for all g
2. R0(g) > 0 for all g.
3. τ1(g) = max(Supp(Pˆg)) for all g
4. R1(g) > 0 for all g.
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Figure 4: For threshold post-processors with deferrals, defer between the thresholds.
Notice that these classifiers cannot be trivial, because we defined R0 and R1 in a way that
prohibits the possibility that the composed classifier never returns 0 or 1. For the cases where the
range of soft classifier outputs is infinite and there is no max or min element, these classifiers do
not exist.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. The reasoning is similar to the non-deferral case for equality of PPV
alone. The thresholds only allow one score s to map to 0 and one score to map to 1. Thus, PPV
for both groups is equal to the largest score in the support and NPV for both groups is equal to 1
minus the smallest score in the support.
Now, much like in Proposition 3.6, which showed the existence of meaningful non-trivial thresh-
old post-processors that equalized PPV across groups, we show the existence of meaningful, non-
trivial deferring threshold post-processors that equalize PPV and NPV across groups.
Proposition 4.2. Let Sˆ be a soft classifier with a nice AP that is groupwise calibrated for a set
of groups G. Suppose that |Supp(Pˆg)| ≥ 2 for all g ∈ G. Then there exists a non-trivial threshold
post-processor Dˆ(τ0,τ1,R0,R1) that is not one of those defined in Proposition 4.1, such that the hard
classifier Yˆ = Dˆ(τ0,τ1,R0,R1) ◦ Sˆ equalizes PPVg and NPVg for all g ∈ G.
The main idea of the proof of this proposition is to use Proposition 3.6 twice: once for getting
thresholds to equalize the PPV, and once for thresholds to equalize the NPV. These thresholds
may be invalid because there may be a group g for which τ0(g) > τ1(g). We use Claims 3.1 and 3.2
to allow ourselves to push the PPV thresholds toward 1 and the NPV thresholds toward 0 until
they no longer overlap, while still maintaining equalization of PPV and NPV for the other groups.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Recall by Claim 3.1 that the PPV of Sˆ on a group g monotonically
increases as τ1(g) increases and, if τ1(g) is constant, as R1(g) increases. By Claim 3.1, NPV
monotonically increases as τ0(g) decreases, and, if τ0(g) is constant, as R0(g) increases. Recall
by Claim 3.2 that if the total variance distance between conditional APs (conditioned on being
post-processed to a result of 1) for different groups is at most , then the PPV difference for these
groups is bounded by O(). Thus, PPVg is continuous and monotonically increasing with regard to
(τ1(g),R1(g)). Similarly, NPVg is continuous and monotonically increasing with (−τ0(g),R0(g)).
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We know by Proposition 3.6 that there exists a non-group blind threshold rule (without defer-
rals) that equalizes the PPV among the groups. By the analogous Proposition A.4, there exists a
(different) non-group-blind threshold rule that equalizes the NPV among the groups. For both of
these, we know that they are not the classifiers from Proposition 4.1.
If the thresholds meet the conditions of being a deferring post-processor listed in Definition 4.3,
then the statement is proven. If they do not meet the conditions because the thresholds “overlap,”
we repeat the following procedure until the conditions are met:
1. Let g be a group for which the conditions are not met, i.e. either τ0(g) > τ1(g), or τ0(g) = τ1(g)
and R0(g) +R1(g) > 1.
2. If τ0(g) > τ1(g), define t
′ = τ0(g)+τ1(g)2 . Let t = arg mins∈Supp(Pˆg) |s− t′|. Notice that t ≤ τ0(g)
and t ≥ τ1(g), but because by assumption τ0(g) > τ1(g), t cannot be equal to both thresholds.
Set the new value for both thresholds to t: τ0(g) = τ1(g) = t(g).
3. If R0(g) +R(g) > 1, then do the following:
(a) If τ0(g) remained unaltered in the previous step, then keep R0(g) the same, and set
R1(g) = 1−R0(g).
(b) If τ1(g) remained unaltered in the previous step, then setR1(g) the same and setR0(g) =
1−R1(g).
(c) If neither of these is true, then let r = R0(g)R0(g)+R1(g) . Set R0(g) = r and R1(g) = 1− r.
4. These thresholds are no longer overlapping, but they altered PPVg and NPVg. Notice that,
by the monotonicity properties described above, the threshold rules were changed in ways
that can only increase PPVg or NPVg:
(a) τ1(g) has increased or remained constant
(b) if τ1(g) remained constant, then R1(g) also remained constant
(c) τ0(g) has decreased or remained constant
(d) if τ0(g) remained constant, then R0(g) remained constant
The new PPV and NPV for g may now be higher than those of the other groups.
5. For all other groups g′ 6= g, by the Intermediate Value Theorem and the continuity of NPV,
there exists some (τ0(g
′),R(g′)) that sets NPVg′ = NPVg, and by the monotonicity of NPV,
this threshold is lower than the old one. Similarly, there exists some (τ1(g
′),R(g′)) that sets
PPVg′ = PPVg and it is higher than the old one. By the monotonicity of PPV and NPV, we
know that this process will not cause non-overlapping thresholds to become overlapping.
The ultimate effect of these steps was to reduce the number of overlapping thresholds by at
least one. We can repeat this process up to 2|G| times until none of the thresholds overlap.
Notice that this classifier is not one of the ones from Proposition 4.1 - if we did not have to
correct for “overlapping,” then this is true by assumption, and if we did do the correction process,
then τ0(g) = τ1(g) for at least one g, and by assumption we had |Supp(Pˆ)| ≥ 2.
Thus, we have created valid a post-processor Dˆ(τ0,τ1,R0,R1) that equalizes PPV and NPV for all
groups simultaneously and is not one of the ones in Proposition 4.1, proving the claim.
25
The following example demonstrates that it is sometimes possible to equalize PPV, NPV, FPR,
and FNR using deferrals, but without equalizing the APs themselves:
Example 4.1 (Equalizing PPV, NPV, cFPR, and cFNR with Thresholds). This example is pre-
sented with continuous support [0, 1] for simplicity. Consider two APs, one for group g1 and one
for g2. Let the AP for g1 be uniform (with density give by the line Pˆ(s) = 1), and let the AP for
group g2 have density given by the parabola Pˆ(s) = 6s(1− s), as shown in Figure 5.
Consider the post-processor Dˆsoft(τ0,τ1).
4 Let τ0(g1) = τ0(g1) = 0.5, let τ0(g2) =
1
6(5−
√
7) and let
τ1(g2) = 1− 16(5−
√
7) as shown in Figure 5.
The PPV and NPV of both groups is 34 , and the cFPR and cFNR of both is
1
4 , thus equalizing
all four values.
This example is somewhat unsatisfactory because the base rates are equal in the two groups. We
did not find a similar example without equal base rates.
Figure 5: This threshold post-processor equalizes PPV, NPV, cFPR, and cFNR as described in Example 4.1.
4.2 Equalizing APs with deferrals
As with Claim 3.4, equalizing the conditional APs between groups renders trivial the task of
downstream decision-making subject to equality of PPV, NPV, cFPR, and cFNR. Importantly,
unlike in Section 3.5, equalizing the conditional APs between groups does not require the groups
to have equal base rates, greatly increasing the applicability of this approach.
Claim 4.1. If the conditional APs are equal for two groups, then PPV, NPV, cFPR, and cFNR
are equalized (or simultaneously undefined) by any hard deferring post-processor Dˆ satisfying (1)
group blindness and (2) Dˆ(⊥, g) = ⊥ (∀g).
The additional condition—that Dˆ defers on input ⊥—is necessary: if Dˆ output 1 on all inputs
(even on ⊥), then PPV would remain unequal as long as the base rates differed. The proof is
similar to the proof of Claim 3.4.
4In the case where the distributions are continuous, R0 and R1 are meaningless because Pr[s = τ0(g)] = Pr[s =
τ1(g)] = 0∀s.
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Proof of Claim 4.1. We prove only that PPV is equalized; the remaining properties may be proved
similarly. Let Yˆ = Dˆ ◦ Sˆ. All probabilities below are over Xg ∼ Xg, and the coins of Sˆ and Dˆ.
PPVYˆ ,g = Pr[Y (Xg) = 1 | Yˆ (Xg, g) = 1]
=
Pr[Y (Xg) = 1 | Sˆ(Xg) 6= ⊥]
Pr[Yˆ (Xg, g) = 1 | Sˆ(Xg) 6= ⊥]
·
∑
s∈Supp(Pˆg)
(
Pr[Y (Xg) = 1 | Sˆ(Xg) = s] · Pr[Sˆ(Xg) = s | Sˆ(Xg) 6= ⊥]
Pr[Y (Xg) = 1 | Sˆ(Xg) 6= ⊥]
· Pr[Dˆ(s, g) = 1 | Sˆ(Xg) = s, Y (Xg) = 1]
)
Each factor in this product is equal across groups by the assumptions. Namely, Pr[Y (Xg) = 1 |
Sˆ(Xg) 6= ⊥] is equalized by calibration and equalized APs; Pr[Yˆ (Xg, g) = 1 | Sˆ(Xg) 6= ⊥] by
group blindness and equalized APs; Pr[Dˆ(s, g) = 1 | Sˆ(Xg) = s, Y (Xg) = 1] by group blindness;
Pr[Y (Xg) = 1 | Sˆ(Xg) = s] by calibration; and finally Pr[Sˆ(Xg) = s | Sˆ(Xg) 6= ⊥] by equalized
APs.
Deferrals are a powerful tool for manipulating, and thereby equalizing, conditional APs. Con-
sider a function Q : (s, g) 7→ [0, 1]
DˆsoftQ (s, g) =
{
⊥ if s = ⊥
⊥ w.p. Q(s, g), else s otherwise
If Sˆ is a calibrated classifier, the soft deferring classifier Sˆ′ := DˆsoftQ ◦ Sˆ is still calibrated. For a
group g, let Pˆg be the AP of Sˆ and Pˆ ′g be the AP of Sˆ′. There is a simple graphical intuition for
the shape of Pˆ ′g, as shown in Figure 6. More formally,
Pˆ ′g(s) =
Pˆg(s)(1−Q(s, g))
1−∆ (7)
where ∆ := Pr[Sˆ′(Xg) = ⊥ | Sˆ(Xg) 6= ⊥] =
∑
s∈Supp(Pˆg) Pˆg(s)Q(s, g).
By appropriate choice of Q, any conditional AP can be transformed into almost any other
conditional AP.
Theorem 4.1. Let Pˆg be a conditional AP of a soft classifier Sˆ on group g, and let Pˆ∗ be any
probability mass function such that Supp(Pˆ∗) ⊆ Supp(Pˆg). Then there exists Q for which the
calibrated AP Pˆ ′g of DˆsoftQ ◦ Sˆ is equal to Pˆ∗.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Let ∆ = 1−mins∈Supp(Pˆg)
Pˆg(s)
Pˆ∗(s) . For all s ∈ Supp(Pˆg), let
Q(s, g) = 1− Pˆ
∗(s)
Pˆg(s)
· (1−∆).
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Observe that ∑
s∈Supp(Pˆg)
Pˆg(s)Q(s, g) =
∑
s∈Supp(Pˆg)
(
Pˆg(s)− (1−∆)Pˆ∗(s)
)
= ∆
and hence ∆ is defined as in Equation 7, where we used the fact that
∑ Pˆg(s) = ∑ Pˆ∗(s) = 1 in
the last line. Plugging into the earlier formula for Pˆ ′g (Equation 7) completes the proof.
Together, Theorem 4.1 and Claim 4.1 suggest a general framework for using deferrals to post-
process a soft, possibly deferring classifier Sˆ which is groupwise calibrated into a hard deferring
classifier which simultaneously equalizes PPV, NPV, cFPR, and cFNR across groups, as follows.
For each g ∈ G, let Pˆg be the conditional AP of Sˆ for group g. Let Pˆ∗ be any conditional
AP such that Supp(Pˆ∗) ⊆ ∩g∈GSupp(Pˆg). Use Theorem 4.1 to equalize the conditional APs for all
groups g ∈ G. Then use any hard post-processor Dˆ satisfying the requirements of Claim 4.1 to
make the ultimate deferring hard classifier. This method is shown in Figure 6.
This framework allows for enormous flexibility in the choice of both Pˆ∗ and Dˆ, even when
considering just two groups g1 and g2. In Figure 10, we illustrate the first step of the framework on
a COMPAS dataset using min{Pˆg1 , Pˆg2} as Pˆ∗, where g1 is African-Americans and g2 is Caucasians.
In Figures 8 and 9 in Section 5, we also use Pˆg1 and Pˆg2 as Pˆ∗.
Figure 6: Choosing deferrals cleverly allows transforming one AP into another (conditional) AP. In this example, the
solid orange line is the original AP Pˆg = Pr[Sˆ(Xg) = s]. By deferring at the rates indicated by the shaded region,
the resulting conditional AP Pˆ ′g = Pr[Sˆ(Xg) = s | Sˆ(Xg) 6= ⊥] is represented by the dark blue line. The area of the
shaded region is ∆.
One can design Pˆ∗ to achieve additional goals. For example, the choice Pˆ∗ = min{Pˆg1 , Pˆg2}
results in equal deferral rate across each group (equal to the total variation distance between the two
initial conditional APs). The framework can be further expanded by combining deferrals with other
methods for manipulating conditional APs, including the mass-averaging discussed in Section 3.5.
A better understanding of these techniques is left for future work.
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5 Experiments on COMPAS Data
We test our methodology on the Broward County data made publicly available by ProPublica
[ALMK16]. This data set contains the recidivism risk decile scores given by the COMPAS tool,
2-year recidivism outcomes, and a number of demographic and crime-related variables on individu-
als who were scored in 2013 and 2014. We restrict our attention to the subset of defendants whose
race is recorded as African-American or Caucasian. These will form the two groups with respect to
which we wish to examine different fairness criteria. After applying the same data pre-processing
and filtering as reported in the ProPublica analysis, we are left with a data set on n = 5278 indi-
viduals, of whom 3175 are African-American and 2103 are Caucasian.
Indeed, it has been shown that the COMPAS scoring mechanism is an approximately calibrated
soft classifier with 10 possible outcomes. We note here that the distribution of the COMPAS scores
differs significantly across the two groups. In particular, the scores for Caucasians are more evenly
distributed as opposed to the skewed distribution seen with African-Americans.
5.1 Thresholding with Deferrals
We first ran our two-threshold post-processing mechanism (Section 4.1) and obtained a binary de-
cision algorithm with deferrals which equalizes both PPV and NPV across Caucasians and African-
Americans (See Figure 7). For simplicity we avoid using randomization for members within a
particular decile score and instead settle for approximate equalization of PPV and NPV. We ob-
serve that the percent of deferrals in total is smaller than 20% of the decisions to be made which
shows that a fairly large number of the defendants can be classified without having to defer to a
downstream decision maker.
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Figure 7: Two thresholds are applied to each AP for the COMPAS data from 2016, (approximately) equalizing PPV
and NPV. In the left plot we show the thresholds for the African American group, and in the right plot, we show the
thresholds for the Caucasian group.
The thresholds suffer from the issue highlighted in Example 3.1, demonstrating that blindly
equalizing PPV and NPV using thresholds can be problematic. Namely, the resulting deferring
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hard classifier is much stricter for African-Americans than for Caucasians.
Next we look at our post-processing mechanisms to equalize all four quantities PPV, NPR,
FPR, and NPR using deferrals (Section 4.2). As was noted earlier in the paper, equalizing the APs
of the two groups post-deferral achieves the goal of equalizing all four of the above quantities. We
implement two methods for doing so.
5.2 Converting one AP into Another
In the first method, decisions are deferred only on one group so as to convert its AP into that of
the other group. First, we consider deferring only on Caucasians to convert their AP into that of
African-Americans (Figure 9); next, decisions are deferred only for African Americans (Figure 8).
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Figure 8: Our conditional AP equalization method applied
to COMPAS data from 2016. We use deferrals to create
a conditional AP for African Americans that matches the
AP for Caucasians.
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Figure 9: We create a conditional AP for Caucasians us-
ing the AP for African Americans. Notice the difference
in the rates and distributions of deferrals between the two
methods.
5.3 Equalizing APs
Alternately we have a second method where decisions are deferred for an equal fraction of Cau-
casians and of African Americans (Figure 10). This fraction is precisely equal to the statistical
(total variation) distance between the distributions of scores produced by the soft classifier on the
two groups.
We observe several striking phenomena on the COMPAS data set. First, using the method of
deferring only on African-Americans we defer on roughly 36% of the total decisions. This number
goes down to roughly 25% when we defer only on Caucasians. This seems to suggest as a general
heuristic to try and use deferrals on the group with smaller size. The total deferral fraction is also
roughly 25% when we defer on an equal fraction of Caucasians and African-Americans.
Second, for all three methods that equalize the score distributions, deferrals happen more on the
“extremes”, namely on individuals with respect to which the classifier had relatively high confidence
(either close to 0 or close to 1). This stands in sharp contrast to how the two-threshold method
(Figure 7) distributes its deferrals—they occur only in the middle of the distribution (namely for
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Figure 10: A version of our conditional AP equalization method applied to COMPAS data from 2016. The AP for
African Americans and the AP for Caucasians are converted into a conditional AP that has the same distribution as
the pointwise minimum of the two APs. Notice that the total deferral rate is equalized between the two groups (this is
equal to precisely the total variation distance between the two APs), but the distribution of deferrals across scores is
not.
elements for which the classifier is “unsure”). More work is needed to better understand the full
space of deferral strategies.
6 Models of Deferring
Whether or not a classifier is thought of as promoting fairness depends on the context; this is true
for both deferring and non-deferring classifiers. In addition to the myriad considerations present
for non-deferring classifiers, deferring classifiers and downstream decision makers introduce some
additional axes for consideration.
Cost to the individual: Even though it is not intended to be a final decision, a deferral may
impose burdensome costs to an individual being classified. It may mean that a defendant remains in
jail while additional hearings are scheduled, that invasive and expensive medical tests are ordered,
or that continued investigation engenders social stigma. These costs may not be borne equally by
all individuals, and may depend on their group membership, their true type, or other factors. For
example, a delay in granting a loan to a applicant may overly burden poorer applicants, even those
very likely to repay.
Cost to the decider: Allowing deferrals might make the decision process more cost-effective:
Given that in most cases making a determination is cheap, one may now invest more in the deferred
cases. For instance, a team of trained moderators might be hired to manually review content
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on which an automated content filter defers, or an expensive investigation might be required to
adjudicate insurance claims that are not cut-and-dry.
Accuracy of downstream decision One reason to defer is to introduce a delay that will allow
for a more accurate decision. Thus the usefulness of allowing a classifier to defer depends on
the accuracy of the downstream decision maker. Additional medical tests might allow for highly
accurate diagnoses. But a judge deciding bail will be prone to a variety of errors and biases.
“Fairness” of downstream decision (and of composed classifier) Similar to the above, the
fairness of the downstream decision maker (however one wants to interpret that) will impact our
interpretation of the deferring classifier. Here one should take into account also the ”procedural”
aspect of the two-step evaluation; here it is important that the downstream classifier will be deemed
as ”more fair” and ”more knowledgeable” than the first stage. Exploring fairness criteria for
systems of deferring classifiers and downstream decision-makers, e.g. as done in [BKN+17] did for
non-deferring classifiers, is an interesting direction for future work.
Frequency of decisions In many settings, the deferring classifier is a fast, automated test
(e.g., automated risk assessment) while the downstream decision maker is a slow, manual process
(e.g., parole board). However, we anticipate situations in which there may be repeated deferring
classifiers chained together which comprise the complete decision making pipeline. For example,
a doctor might have a sequence of diagnostic tests at her disposal as needed, or a bank might
allow many rounds of appeal for loan applications, but with lengthy delays. Some applications
might even permit hundreds or thousands of near-continuous deferring classifiers. As an example,
consider a live video streaming platform that passively monitors streams for inappropriate content
in real time. The automated passive monitor might decide the content is inappropriate, and shut it
down; appropriate, and continue passive monitoring; or suspicious (by deferring), and begin active
monitoring by devoting more computing resources or bringing in a human moderator.
6.1 Technical implications of deferral model
The contextual considerations discussed above directly impact the appropriate application of a
deferring classifier and its goals. An obvious goal is to minimize the overall rate of deferrals
while maintaining the best possible FPR, FNR, PPV, and NPV for the classifier conditioned on
not deferring, and without considering the distribution of deferrals. However, one might desire
very different properties from the distribution of deferrals in different contexts. The deferrals
may be distributed differently among individuals with different true type, group membership, or
soft-classifier scores, while the burden imposed by deferrals and errors may differ greatly between
different populations.
In a medical diagnosis scenario, a false negative (i.e., failing to diagnose a disease) may have
serious consequences, and deferring to run additional non-invasive and inexpensive additional tests
may be generally acceptable. On the other hand, an insurance provider may prefer to minimize
expensive investigations by paying out more false claims.
The context may also affect the way one defines the deferral analogues of FPR and FNR. While
calibration, PPV, and NPV apply directly to deferring classifiers, it is not clear how best to generalize
the definitions of error rates. For example, consider false positive rate: by Definition 2.5, the false
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positive rate of a non-deferring hard classifier Yˆ for a group g is FPRYˆ ,g = Pr[Yˆ (Xg) = 1 | Y (Xg) =
0].
The approach we take in Section 4 is to condition on not deferring (Definition 4.1). A deferring
classifier Yˆ that output 1 on half of true negative instances (within a g) would have conditional
false positive rate as low as 0.5 (if it never output ⊥ on true negatives) or as high as 1 (if it never
output 0 on true negatives). The conditional false positive rate is agnostic towards the downstream
decision maker. It codifies no value judgements as to whether a deferral is desirable or undesirable
as an individual nor whether deferrals ultimately result in accurate or inaccurate decisions. This
is, itself, a value judgement.
A second approach is to leave the original definition unchanged. The same deferring hard
classifier as above would have unconditional false positive rate 0.5. This would be true regardless of
whether Yˆ output 0 or ⊥ on the other half of true negative instances. We call this the unconditional
false positive rate. The unconditional false positive rate effectively categorizes deferrals as correct
outputs. This may be appropriate if the downstream decision maker has very high accuracy. If,
for example, a doctor orders an additional, more accurate diagnostic test in response to a deferral,
the unconditional false positive rate might be appropriate.
Finally, a third approach is to base our measure of inaccuracy on true negatives instead of false
positives, a reverse of the above.
Just as in the case of non-deferring classifiers, the relationships among these contrasting group
statistics, their meaningfulness in different settings, and their application in different settings are
not well understood and deserve further study.
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A Results for NPV and Continuous, Full Support APs
A.1 Results for Negative Predictive Value (NPV)
In Section 3, we proved limitations on the ability of post-processors to equalize PPV given a
distribution on calibrated scores with finite support. For completeness, in this section, we give the
statements of the analogous limitations for equalizing NPV and for continuous probability density
functions with full support [0, 1].
We start with the analogous statement of Proposition 3.3 for NPV instead of PPV.
Proposition A.1. Fix two disjoint groups g1 and g2 with respective base rates BR1 and BR2 such
that BR1 6= BR2. Then there exists a soft-valued classifier Sˆ that is groupwise calibrated, but for
which there is no post-processor Dˆ : [0, 1] × G → {0, 1} such that Dˆ ◦ Sˆ equalizes NPV, unless
Pr[Dˆ(BRi, gi) = 0] = 0 for i = 1 or 2.
The nontriviality condition ensures that the NPV is well-defined on both groups (which can be
compared to the nontriviality condition in Proposition 3.3, which ensures that the PPV is well-
defined on both groups). The proof is essentially identical to the proof of Proposition 3.3: the
fraction of predicted 0’s in group gi that are true 0’s is 1−BRi, as the post-processor has no other
information by which to make its decision, and hence the NPVs are unequal due to the differing
base rates.
We now proceed to give the NPV analogs of our results on threshold post-processors in Section 3.
We start with the analogous statement for Proposition 3.4 - that there is a class of simple group-
blind threshold post-processors that equalizes the NPV across groups.
Proposition A.2. For every nice groupwise calibrated soft classifier Sˆ and for every group-blind
threshold post-processor Dˆ(τ,R) such that τ(g) = min(Supp(Pˆg)) and R(g) < 1 for all g, the com-
posed classifer Dˆ ◦ Sˆ equalizes NPVs across all groups.
The existence of the threshold post-processors in Proposition A.2 follows from the assumed
finiteness of the range of the soft classifier. In the case where the range of the soft classifier is
infinite, such post-processors may not exist (as there may be no minimum element of the support).
The proof is once again analogous to the proof of Proposition 3.4: these classifiers only ever output
0 on the minimum element of the support of Pˆg, and hence the NPV is simply 1 minus the smallest
element of the support for each group.
However, much like the case for PPV, other group-blind threshold post-processors cannot pos-
sibly equalize NPV.
Proposition A.3. There exists a groupwise-calibrated soft classifier with a nice AP for which no
non-trivial group blind threshold post-processor, other than the ones in Proposition 3.4, can equalize
NPV across groups.
The example of the groupwise-calibrated soft classifier is the exact same one that shows the
statement for PPV. Indeed, we can see this in the following way. We can make the example in
the proof of Proposition A.3 have equal base rates across groups, in which case it follows from
Proposition 3.5 due to Claim 3.3.
When we turn to threshold post-processors that are not group-blind, we again get analogous
results for NPV.
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Proposition A.4. Let G be a set of groups. For any soft classifier Sˆ with a nice AP Pˆ such
that Sˆ is groupwise-calibrated over G and |Supp(Pˆg)| ≥ 2 for all g ∈ G, there exists a ( non-group-
blind), non-trivial threshold post-processor Dˆ(τ,R) that is not one of the group blind post-processors
in Proposition 3.4, such that the hard classifier Yˆ = Dˆ(τ,R) ◦ Sˆ equalizes NPV across G.
This holds even if we require that the NPV of all the groups is an arbitrary value in (smin,mini BRgi),
where mini BRgi is the minimum base rate among the groups and smin is the minimum score in the
support of Pˆgi.5
Again the proof of this follows via the same kind of continuity argument as we used to prove
Proposition 3.6. By definition, each group has base rate at least mini BRgi , and so if the post-
processor always says 0 on some group i, then NPVgi = BRgi ≥ mini BRgi . Hence, for each group,
we can start with the always-0 classifier and slide down the threshold until the desired NPV is
reached.
Finally, the socially unsatisfying example also generalizes to NPV. A privileged group will have
higher scores than a disadvantaged group in general, and hence if they are given the same threshold,
the NPV will be lower on the privileged group. To rectify this, the threshold for the disadvantaged
group will have to moved higher, to decrease the NPV. But then, the disadvantaged group is being
subjected to a harsher standard.
Finally we note that Claim 3.2 also can be written with NPV instead of PPV, where the proof
follows from using the characterization of NPV given in Proposition 3.1:
Claim A.1 (Continuity of NPV). Fix a soft classifier Sˆ and a corresponding AP Pˆ, as well as a
group g. Let Dˆ1 and Dˆ2 be two post-processing algorithms. Let Pˆg,Dˆ1 be the expected conditional
AP that results from starting with the AP Pˆg over scores in group g and then conditioning on the
scores that Dˆ1 sends to 0, and define Pˆg,Dˆ2 similarly. If dTV (Pˆg,Dˆ1 , Pˆg,Dˆ2) < , then |NPVg,Dˆ1◦Sˆ −
NPVg,Dˆ2◦Sˆ | < O().
We omit the proof of Claim A.1, which resembles the proof of Claim 3.2 and follows from
Proposition 3.1.
A.2 Results for Continuous, Full Support APs
In this section, we briefly address how to extend our results on thresholds in Section 3 to the
setting where every AP Pˆ is a continuous probability distribution with Supp(Pˆg) = [0, 1] for all
g ∈ G - that is, the support equals the entire interval [0, 1] for each group g ∈ G. Note that this
automatically makes Pˆ a “nice” AP, and hence rules out the general counterexample we came up
with in Proposition 3.3. For the purposes of this section, call such an AP that 1) Pˆg is a continuous
probability density function for every g ∈ G and 2) Supp(Pˆg) = [0, 1] for all g ∈ G a very nice
AP. As the name suggests, we can extend the remaining results in Section 3 to the setting of very
nice AP. We give the results for equalizing PPV as done in Section 3: extending these results to
equalizing NPV in the setting of continuous, full support AP can be accomplished by combining
the statements here with the modifications described in Section A.1.
First, we note that a threshold post-processor can be described much more easily in the con-
tinuous setting than in the setting where the AP has finite support on each group. Indeed, in the
setting where Pˆg is a continuous density function for all g ∈ G, the post-processor can truly be a
5For the case where the support of Pˆgi is infinite, smin should be the infimum of scores.
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threshold, with no question of how to classify the score that is exactly equal to the threshold τ .
This is because the score τ has probability 0 under the density Pˆg.
Hence, Proposition 3.4 has no true analog in this setting. This follows because the maximum
element of the support in this case is 1, and a threshold at τ = 1 sends every score (outside of a
measure 0 set) to 0.
This allows us to strengthen Proposition 3.5 accordingly.
Proposition A.5. There exists a groupwise-calibrated soft classifier with a very nice AP for which
no non-trivial group blind threshold post-processor can equalize PPV across groups.
This follows from a nearly identical stochastic domination argument to the one used for Proposi-
tion 3.5 - in fact, the natural generalization of the distributions given for the proof of Proposition 3.5
to the continuous and full-support setting can be used in this proof.
A non group blind threshold can still always equalize PPV for very nice APs.
Proposition A.6. Let G be a set of groups. For any soft classifier Sˆ with a very nice AP Pˆ such
that Sˆ is groupwise-calibrated over G, then there exists a non group blind, non-trivial threshold
post-processor such that the hard classifier equalizes PPV across G.
This holds even if we require that the PPV of all the groups is equal to an arbitrary value in
(maxi BRgi , 1), where maxi BRgi is the maximum base rate among the groups gi ∈ G.
This follows from the same continuity approach as the proof of Proposition 3.6, by sliding the
threshold continuously down from 1 until the PPV reaches the desired value v ∈ (maxi BRgi , 1).
The socially unsatisfying example generalizes in the natural way - Example 3.1 consists of one
group having a monotonically increasing PMF and another one having a monotonically decreasing
PMF. We can skip the discretization step in the definition of these PMFs and have them be
continuous PDFs, and the example still goes through.
We cannot equalize PPV and NPV simultaneously in general, just like in the finite support case
(Proposition 3.7).
Proposition A.7. Fix groups g1 and g2. There exists a soft classifier Sˆ with a very nice AP Pˆ
such that no threshold post-processor can simultaneously equalize PPV and NPV between groups g1
and g2.
The proof we give of Proposition 3.7 for finite support naturally generalizes to this case - in
fact, we can simply use the same proof but without discretizing the probability distributions. The
necessary lemmas about monotonicity of PPV and being able to express the base rate as a convex
combination of PPV and NPV still hold.
It is unsurprising that the result in Section 4 on using thresholds with deferrals to equalize PPV
and NPV also goes through for very nice AP.
Proposition A.8. Let Sˆ be groupwise calibrated for the n groups g1, . . . , gn, and suppose that Sˆ
has a very nice AP. Then there exists a nontrivial threshold decision rule rule such that the hard
classifier Yˆ = Dˆ ◦ Sˆ equalizes PPV and NPV for G.
Again, the explanation is very similar to the one for Proposition A.6. PPV and NPV change
continuously when we slide the respective thresholds, and unlike the case without deferrals, we can
change the PPV without changing the NPV, by keeping the “0” threshold still and sliding the “1”
threshold (and deferring in the middle). Hence, we can simply continuously slide the two thresholds
on each group until they reached the desired values.
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